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Many important decisions handed down by the courts over the years have often been in 
cases where the subject matter (around which the dispute focused) was rather ordinary - 
even mundane. For example, Donoghue v Stevenson2 concerned a snail in a bottle of 
ginger beer; Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd.3 reviewed the 
rental arrangements of a block of London flats; Salomon v Salomon4 examined a leather 
and boot manufacturing business and Grant v Australian Knitting Mills5 looked at two 
sets of long underwear. Even at the European Union (EU) level, there are similar cases: 
Van Gend en Loos6 concerned a consignment of ureaformaldehyde and Cassis de Dijon7 
centred on a blackcurrant liqueur. However, as with most cases, it is not the subject 
matter but the legal principle which the court enunciates (or confirms) that is the 
important aspect of the case. As has been commented in relation to Van Gend en Loos: 
The ruling of the Court of Justice … constituted … a major 
constitutional step in the development of the European Community. Its 
core element is the ruling that the Treaty of Rome represents more than a 
mere international agreement imposing obligations, at the level of 
international law, as between the contracting States. It confers rights on 
individuals which become part of their legal heritage and which national 
courts are bound to protect. From this central proposition the Court then 
or later deduced many of the main principles of Community law.8  
Likewise, as regards Cassis de Dijon, the significance lies in the fact that there the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) gave ‘an expansive interpretation of Article 28 (ex 
Article 30) of the EC Treaty, extending its net to catch any State measure capable of 
interfering with the market in respect of intra-Community trade in goods’.9 Recently, the 
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ECJ gave judgments in two cases (Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain10 and Case 
C-14/00 Commission v Italy11) the subject matter of which was also something quite 
ordinary - that normal everyday delicacy, ‘chocolate’. However, once again, the court’s 
decision is important not for that fact but for what the court decided.  
2. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
The basis of the European Union’s Single Market is the free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital within the European Union (the most important of these 
being the free movement of goods). Without this free movement, there could be no Single 
European Market. As Agnete Philipson has commented, ‘[t]he free movement of goods is 
a cornerstone of the Single Market and the European Commission is vigilant in ensuring 
the free movement provisions, as contained in the Treaty, are upheld, most significantly, 
by investigating alleged infringements of the provisions by Member States.12  
  
Article 28 EC prohibits EU Member States from imposing quantitative restrictions and  
measures having equivalent effect on imports of goods between Member States – and, for 
many years, the ECJ has consistently struck down a wide range of measures as being 
quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.13 As can be seen from such 
cases as Case 34/79 R v Henn and Darby,14 anything which restricts importation by 
reference to quantity (e.g. a quota system) is a quantitative restriction. The nature of 
‘measures having equivalent effect’ can be seen from such cases as Case 249/81 
Commission v Ireland (Re ‘Buy Irish’ Campaign).15 In that case, the advertising 
campaign was held to be equivalent to a restriction although it merely encouraged 
consumers to purchase Irish goods rather than imported ones.  
 
In fact, the concept of measures having equivalent effect has been widely interpreted by 
the ECJ. In Dassonville,16 the ECJ stated its definition of measures having equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions in the following terms: 
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All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.17
 
In Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ said that measures having equivalent effect include not only 
‘distinctly applicable measures’ (i.e. those which discriminate against imported goods) 
but also ‘indistinctly applicable measures’ (i.e. those which ostensibly apply to both 
domestic and imported goods but which in fact do impede free trade between the EU 
Member States). In Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ applied the aforementioned Dassonville 
formula but added what is now known as the ‘first Cassis principle’, namely: 
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities 
between national laws relating to the marketing of the products in 
question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be 
recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the 
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and 
the defence of the consumer.18  
What this means is that certain measures will not breach Article 28 EC if they are 
necessary to satisfy certain ‘mandatory requirements’ (such as protection of the 
consumer), even though such measures may come within the ‘Dassonville formula’ 
because they are indistinctly applicable measures.19  
 
Additionally, there is a requirement for a measure to be ‘proportionate’, i.e. where the 
Member State maintains that the measure is allowable since it is a mandatory 
requirement, the Member State will not succeed where the measure employed to pursue 
the mandatory requirement is disproportionate to the objective to be achieved. In Cassis 
de Dijon, the ECJ also laid down the ‘second Cassis principle’ which is a (rebuttable) 
presumption that normally there is no valid reason why, provided they have been lawfully 
produced and marketed in one of the EU Member States, such goods should not be 
introduced and marketed in any other of the other EU Member States. 
 
Thus, subject to what has been said above, in essence, if a measure is distinctly 
applicable, it will normally breach Article 28 EC, unless it can be justified under Article 
30 EC (which is construed quite narrowly by the ECJ). In other words, Article 30 EC 
provides the main legal basis for justifying quantitative restrictions which are 
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discriminatory in nature. To be an allowable derogation under Article 30 EC, a measure 
needs to come within one of the following: public morality; public policy and public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial or commercial property. Even then, the measure must not constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the EU Member 
States.20
  
3. THE ‘CHOCOLATE’ CASES 
The two ‘chocolate’ cases were Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain and Case C-14/00 
Commission v Italy.21 Judgment in both cases was given by the ECJ on 16 January 2003. 
The cases are essentially similar and involve the same principles of EU law.  
 
As mentioned above, Article 28 EC provides that quantitative restrictions on imports and 
all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between the EU Member States. 
In its actions brought against Spain and Italy pursuant to Article 226 EC, the Commission 
stated that chocolate containing vegetable fats other than cocoa butter up to a maximum 
of 5% of the total weight of the product is manufactured under the name ‘chocolate’ in 
six EU Member States (namely, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and the 
United Kingdom) and that it is accepted under that name in all the EU Member States 
except Spain and Italy. The Commission’s view was therefore that the obligation under 
the Spanish and Italian legislation (requiring the marketing of cocoa and chocolate 
products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa butter under the name ‘chocolate 
substitute’) significantly obstructed the access of such products to the Spanish and Italian 
markets - and accordingly there was a breach of Article 28 EC. 
  
The argument by the Spanish and Italian Governments was that Council Directive 
73/241/EEC of July 24, 1973 on the approximation of the laws of the EU Member States 
relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption22 fully 
regulated the marketing of cocoa and chocolate products, thereby precluding the 
application of Article 28 EC in that, first, it set out the principle that the use of vegetable 
fats other than cocoa butter was prohibited in the manufacture of cocoa and chocolate 
products and, second, it established a system of free movement under the name 
‘chocolate’ only for cocoa and chocolate products which did not contain such vegetable 
fats. The Spanish and Italian Governments therefore contended that Directive 73/241 
enabled the EU Member States (whose national law prohibited the addition of vegetable 
fats other than cocoa butter to products manufactured within their territory) also to 
prohibit the marketing within their territory – under the name ‘chocolate’ – of products 
whose manufacture did not comply with their national legislation.  
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The ECJ, however, in its judgment, stated that it was clear from Article 14(2)(a) of 
Directive 73/241 that the Directive did not seek to establish a fully harmonised system 
under which common rules completely replaced existing national rules in the field, since 
it explicitly authorised the EU Member States to lay down national rules which were 
different from the common rules which it provided for. In accordance with the judgment 
in Cassis de Dijon,23 Article 28 EC prohibits obstacles to the free movement of goods (in 
the absence of the harmonisation of national laws) which are the consequence of applying 
to goods coming from other EU Member States (where they are lawfully manufactured 
and marketed) rules that lay down requirements to be met by those goods (such as those 
relating to their name, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling and 
packaging), even if those rules apply to national and imported products alike.24 
Accordingly, that prohibition also applies to obstacles to the marketing of products whose 
manufacture is not subject to comprehensive harmonisation but which are manufactured 
in conformity with national rules explicitly permitted by the harmonising directive. A 
contrary interpretation would be tantamount to authorising the EU Member States to 
partition their national markets in regard to products not covered by the EU’s 
harmonisation rules, contrary to the objective of free movement pursued by the EC 
Treaty. 
 
The ECJ then went on to consider whether and to what extent Article 28 EC precluded 
the Spanish and Italian legislation which prohibited the marketing in such EU Member 
States of cocoa and chocolate products containing vegetable fats other than cocoa butter 
under the sales name ‘chocolate’ (under which they were lawfully manufactured and 
marketed in the EU Member State of production) and which provided that those products 
could only be marketed under the name ‘chocolate substitute’. 
 
The ECJ stated that it had consistently held that - while a prohibition such as that under 
the national legislation, which entailed the obligation to use a sales name other than that 
used in the EU Member State of production, did not absolutely preclude the importation 
into the EU Member State concerned of the products in question - it was nevertheless 
likely to make their marketing more difficult and thus impede trade between EU Member 
States. Since the obligation imposed by the Spanish and Italian legislation might compel 
the traders concerned to adjust the presentation of their products according to the place 
where they were to be marketed and consequently to incur additional packaging costs, it 
was therefore liable to obstruct intra-Community trade. That was all the more so in view 
of the fact that the name ‘chocolate substitute’ which the traders concerned were required 
to use could adversely affect the consumer’s perception of the products in question, in as 
much as it denoted substitute (and therefore inferior) products. 
  
The ECJ reminded the parties that it is settled case-law that obstacles to intra-Community 
trade resulting from disparities between provisions of national law must be accepted in so 
far as such provisions are applicable to domestic and imported products alike and may be 
justified as being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating, inter alia, 
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to consumer protection. However, in order to be permissible, such provisions have to be 
proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective has to be not capable of being 
achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade. It is legitimate 
for an EU Member State to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the 
products which are offered to them, thus giving them the possibility of making their 
choice on the basis of that information, and in particular EU Member States can, for the 
purpose of protecting consumers, require the description of a foodstuff to be altered 
where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its 
composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that 
description within the Community that it could not be regarded as falling within the same 
category.25 However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling 
should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information. 
  
As pointed out by the ECJ, the characteristic element of cocoa and chocolate products 
(within the meaning of Directive 73/241) is the presence of a certain minimum content of 
cocoa and cocoa butter. The percentages set by Directive 73/241 are minimum contents 
which have to be complied with by all chocolate products manufactured and marketed 
under the name ‘chocolate’ in the EU, independently of whether the legislation of the EU 
Member State of production authorised the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa 
butter. In addition, since Directive 73/241 explicitly permits EU Member States to 
authorise the use of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter, it cannot be claimed that the 
products to which those fats have been added, in compliance with the Directive, are 
altered to the point where they no longer fall into the same category as those which do not 
contain such fats. Therefore, the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter to 
cocoa and chocolate products which satisfy the minimum contents required by Directive 
73/241 cannot substantially alter the nature of those products to the point where they are 
transformed into different products. In the ECJ’s view, it thus followed that the inclusion 
in the label of a neutral and objective statement informing consumers of the presence in 
the product of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter would be sufficient to ensure that 
consumers are given correct information and, in those circumstances, the obligation 
(imposed by the national legislation) to change the sales name of the products would not 
appear to be necessary to satisfy the overriding requirement of consumer protection. It 
therefore followed that the Spanish and Italian legislation – to the extent that the same 
required the name of products which were lawfully manufactured and marketed in other 
EU Member States under the sales name ‘chocolate’ to be altered for the sole reason that 
they contained vegetable fats other than cocoa butter was incompatible with Article 28 
EC.  
 
Accordingly, the ECJ held that, by prohibiting cocoa and chocolate products which 
complied with the requirements as to minimum content laid down in Directive 73/241 to 
which vegetable fats other than cocoa butter had been added (and which were lawfully 
manufactured in EU Member States which authorised the addition of such fats) from 
being marketed in Spain and Italy under the name used in the EU Member State of 
production - and by requiring that those products could only be marketed under the name 
                                                 
25 The ECJ, when making this point, referred to such cases as Case C-366/98 Criminal proceedings against 
Geffroy [2000] ECR I-6579. 
 6
‘chocolate substitute’, Spain and Italy had failed to fulfil their obligations under Article 
28 EC. 
4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ‘CHOCOLATE’ CASES 
Europe’s thirty year old ‘chocolate war’ (which started in 1973 when the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined what is now known as the European Union) has 
finally been ended this year - with the defeat of so-called ‘chocolate purists’ Spain and 
Italy. As a result of the ECJ’s ruling, such countries as the United Kingdom have won the 
right to continue to produce ‘chocolate’ that includes vegetable oil. In essence, the ECJ 
has ruled that Spain and Italy’s insistence that chocolate that does not contain 100% 
cocoa butter be labelled ‘chocolate substitute’26 infringed the EU’s principle of the free 
movement of goods).  
 
Initially, even such countries as Belgium (which likewise have considered the purity of 
chocolate to be very important) objected to what they perceived as false chocolate 
coming into their markets from countries like the United Kingdom. The ‘chocolate’ 
debate raged within the EU until 2000 when the EU Member States struck a deal whereby 
- as long as the United Kingdom products (and similar) were labelled with their fats and 
milk content - they could be called ‘family milk chocolate’. However, although this 
arrangement satisfied such EU Member States as Belgium and France, others – namely 
Spain and Italy - refused to accept this arrangement. They continued unilateral bans, 
leading to the Commission taking action against them in the ECJ which resulted in the 
court’s ruling (against Spain and Italy) on 16 January 2003. 
 
Prima facie, the ECJ’s ruling is good news for the chocolate manufacturers in such 
countries as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark (and also Portugal, Finland and 
Sweden) who will now be able to sell their Double Deckers, Picnic bars, Crunchies, 
Chomp bars, Curly Wurlies, Wispa bars and Flakes anywhere in the European Union 
(including Spain and Italy) - in competition with such local products as Ferrero Rocher. 
However, despite this favourable court ruling, it seems to be commonly agreed that the 
chocolate manufacturers in such countries as the United Kingdom cannot now 
automatically expect to have a sudden surge in their sales (as a result of their being able 
to access such European markets as those of Spain and Italy) since, in any event, 
UK-style chocolate just does not appeal to many European palates. Nevertheless the 
ECJ’s ruling is far from being just a symbolic victory. The judgment in the ‘chocolate’ 
cases is an important ruling in that it has confirmed the importance of the EU’s principle 
of the free movement of goods – and reiterated that obstacles and impediments thereto 
will not be tolerated by the ECJ.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The title (and theme) of this article is ‘European chocolate makes the trade go round (in a 
most delightful way)’. The subject matter of the two ‘chocolate’ cases was chocolate 
emanating from the United Kingdom. The UK is a Member of the EU and hence a 
European country. Thus its chocolate products can properly be designated ‘European 
                                                 
26 As indicated earlier, this implied to consumers that it was an inferior product. 
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chocolate’. The next aspects of the title/theme is that such product (i.e. the UK/European 
chocolate) ‘makes the trade go round’. The outcome of the ‘chocolate’ cases has been, as 
indicated above, to confirm the importance of the EU’s principle of the free movement of 
goods and a reiteration by EU’s highest court (the ECJ) that obstacles and impediments 
thereto will not be tolerated by the ECJ. Further, the ECJ’s ruling in the ‘chocolate’ cases 
is not just confined to ‘chocolate’ and other food products such as pickles and jams – it 
confirms the right of free movement within the EU of many products which have 
‘ingredients’ and ‘components’. The final part of the title/theme is that the ECJ’s ruling 
has confirmed this right of free movement of goods within the EU ‘in a most delightful 
way’. As regards this final aspect, it is submitted that the ECJ’s ruling is a ‘delightful’ 
(i.e. good) outcome because the free movement of goods (which has again, in the 
‘chocolate’ cases, been confirmed and reinforced) is one of the cornerstones of the EU’s 
Single Market which, we should not forget, is the world largest domestic market and 
something which has contributed significantly to growth, competitiveness and 
employment not only in Europe but also in many other countries of the world which do 
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